| About the dissertation: |
| This study examines the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in corporate decision-making at board level from a comparative law perspective, based on the legal systems of Delaware, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. While the AI use of board of directors is still in an experimental phase, the risks that arise from it raise important legal questions. This study makes a distinction between different autonomy levels of AI in the boardroom and shows that their legal permissibility and consequences vary fundamentally. For the lower autonomy levels, the existing open-ended norms of corporate law, such as the duty of care and the proper reliance doctrine, are sufficiently flexible to require AI-related measures of diligence from the board. For the higher autonomy levels, current law imposes a near-total prohibition on AI systems as robo-directors. Still, this study proposes legal solutions for the agency costs that would arise from their future hypothetical establishment. |